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ABSTRACT 
Extensive literature has shown the impact of water scarcity discourses on national 
policies, however the impact of water scarcity discourses on transboundary water 
governance has been overlooked. This article contributes to filling this gap by 
investigating the impact of the water scarcity discourse in the case of Jordan, 
specifically on three cases of transboundary water governance: the Yarmouk River, 
the Jordan River, and the Disi Aquifer. This article shows that the water scarcity 
discourse is not enough to explain transboundary water governance, as it needs to be 
contextualized in the broader context, considering national security, regional 
geopolitics, inter-sectorial interests, and power asymmetries. This is particularly true 
when considering that the Arab region has most of its surface waters originating 
outside of its countries, and transboundary waters represent over two thirds of its 
overall water resources.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This article investigates the effects of the discourse of water scarcity on 
transboundary water governance (TWG) in the case of Jordan. The concept of 
governance refers to laws, policies, regulations, institutional structures and 
arrangements set up to govern (Folke et al., 2005, Huitema et al., 2009, Boyle et al., 
2001). Dryzek (1997: 8) defines a discourse as “a shared way of apprehending the 
world.” Discourses are central in constructing representations of complex 
environmental issues, and in so doing they drive towards certain policy-solutions 
(Leach and Mearns, 1996, Dryzek, 1997: 9-10, Hajer, 1995). 
The focus of this article is important for three reasons; first, most of the water 
resources in Jordan are transboundary (MWI, 2009). Second, the discourse of water 
scarcity is dominant, and it does drive towards policy-solutions (Hussein, 2016). 
Third, the dominant policy-solutions opened by the discourse of water scarcity in the 
Jordanian national water strategy “Water for Life” (WFL) are transboundary: the Red 
Sea Dead Sea Canal (RSDSC) and the Disi projects (MWI, 2009, Hussein, 2016: 
ch.7; Hussein, 2018a). This study contributes to the literature on critical hydropolitics, 
as extensive research has been done on the politics of water scarcity (Mehta, 2001, 
Mehta, 2005, Hussein, 2016, Edwards, 2013, Feitelson, 2002, Shiva, 2002, Perreault, 
2006, Alatout, 2008, Swyngedouw, 1999) – proving that discourses of water scarcity 
do impact policies at the national level (ibid.) -, but little research has been done on 
the impact of water scarcity discourses on TWG (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, Zeitoun 
and Mirumachi, 2008). In addition, while the three basins considered have been 
previously analysed, they have never been studied in a comparative way, as this 
article does.  
After a brief presentation of the methodology, the regional geopolitical 
dynamics, and theoretical framework, this article investigates the hydropolitical 
relations and the role of the water scarcity discourse on the: Jordanian-Syrian 
relations on the Yarmouk River Basin, Jordanian-Israeli on the Jordan River Basin, 
and Jordanian-Saudi on the Disi Aquifer.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Fieldwork took place during intensive twelve months from December 2013 until 
December 2014, spread during different seasons in Jordan, and mainly in Amman, the 
capital of the country. Given the guiding research question What is the impact of the 
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deployment of the water scarcity discourse on transboundary water governance in the 
case of Jordan? the data collection required the deployment of a combination of 
different qualitative methods. The methods of data collection deployed are: document 
collection and semi-structured interviews. The method of data analysis is discourse 
analysis, which allows investigation of the construction and impact of the discourse. 
Data analysis has been undertaken through thematic coding, and after initial use of the 
NVIVO software for analysing the interviews, thematic coding has been applied for 
the analysis of the interviews. The themes and codes utilised for the analysis were: the 
causes and reasons identified for the issue of water scarcity; the solutions they would 
suggest to solve the issue; and the development of the TWG. Concerning the sample, 
the documentation were: the governmental reports on water issues in the country, 
newspaper articles, academic articles, press releases of relevant ministries, reports of 
donors and international organisations. In addition, 89 semi-structured interviews (the 
interviewees are anonymously cited in the text) were conducted especially with those 
involved in TWG, in order to sketch out how the discourse of water scarcity 
interplayed in the TWG negotiations in 1987 (with Syria), 1994 (with Israel), and 
2015 (with Saudi Arabia), and in understanding how the discourse had a role in the 
discussions in the bilateral meetings and in the joint water committees. Hence, the 
main target of these interviews were Jordanian high level and senior governmental 
officials involved in these discussions and negotiations, mainly from the Ministry of 
Water and Irrigation (MWI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Jordan Valley 
Authority (JVA), and current and former diplomats based in Amman or representing 
Jordan in the neighbouring countries. Interviews lasted in average about 30-40 
minutes each, and included several follow up questions according to the answers 
received.  
 
REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS  
This section provides a background to the geopolitical alliances of the Middle East, 
serving as general background information for the analysis of this article. An 
incomplete list of events that have shaped the regional geopolitics in the past 70 years 
relevant to this study is: the Cold War; the establishment of Israel in 1948; the main 
Arab- Israeli wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982; the Iran-Iraq War in 1980-1988; 
the Gulf War between the states of Iraq and Kuwait in early 1990s; the Oslo 
Agreement in 1993; the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1994; the 2003 Iraq War; 
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and the Arab Spring since 2011.  
The governments in the region can agree to work together against security 
threats, but they would refer to different security threats. In fact, for the Egyptian and 
the Emirati governments, the main threat in the region is represented by the Islamic 
movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. For the Saudi and Bahraini governments, 
the main threat is represented by the Iranian government and its influence in the 
region, mainly in the states of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and in Bahrain itself. For 
the Jordanian government the main security threat is the Islamic State. However, the 
recent regional crises are also confirming that those threats are also politically 
constructed to be used for internal and geopolitical aims. 
Another aspect that needs to be considered is represented by foreign aid and 
economic security, mainly aid from the rich countries in the region: the member states 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan are aid 
dependant states, and they do not hesitate to support the GCC countries when required 
and requested. Jawad Anani, former Jordanian Royal Court chief and several-time 
minister, stated that “In addition to being a return of favour to the Gulf States’ 
generous and endless support to Jordan, the Kingdom’s participation has to do with its 
strong cultural, historical, economic and strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf states. Jordan’s national security is inseparable from the security of the 
Arab Gulf region” (Ghazal and Omari, 2015). In an interview to the Jordan Times, the 
former Jordanian minister Samer Qallab emphasised that Jordanian support to the 
Saudi government in the Yemen operation is “at the heart of defending Jordan’s 
national security” (Ghazal and Omari, 2015). The article also underlines that the 
Jordanian priority is not to fight the Iranian expansion of influence in the state of 
Yemen, but rather to show to the GCC countries the Jordanian support, in order to 
maintain their economic support. In terms of Jordanian energy security, trade, 
investments, and labour remittances, the GCC stability and security overlaps with the 
Jordanian national security. 
In line with political economic interests and the perception of security threats 
seen above, Russia’s historical allies in the Middle East before the Arab Spring were: 
the Iraqi government at the time of Saddam Hussein, the Assad government in Syria, 
the Libyan government at Gaddafi’s time, the military regime in Algeria, and the 
Iranian government (Katz, 2015: 2). Alternatively, the historic allies of the United 
States in the region are the governments of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, 
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Afghanistan (after the 2001/2002 war), Israel, Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. The 
Israeli and Egyptian governments were the two leading recipients of United States 
foreign aid as of 2010. The close relationship between the US and the GCC allies is 
shaped by energy, trade, and market interests (Echagüe, 2015: 184, Halliday, 2005: 
334; 336-337). The close alliance between the US and the GCC countries as well as 
the Israeli, Egyptian, and Jordanian governments emerges also by looking at the high 
arms trade from the US towards those countries (Echagüe, 2015: 186). 
The interests of the Israeli, Jordanian, and Saudi governments are similar 
when it comes to the relations with the states of Iran and Syria, and in fighting against 
the expansion of the Iranian influence in the state of Syria and in the neighbouring 
countries. It is also in the interest of these three governments to fight against the 
extremisms of the Islamic State, and to defend their borders. In this sense, the stability 
of the Jordanian state, seen by the Saudi and the Israeli governments as a buffer zone, 
is a priority. In addition, an interview with a senior official from the Ministry of 
foreign Affairs (MFA) for the Israeli government maintaining the stability of the 
Jordanian and Egyptian governments is important as they are the only two Arab states 
that recognise the Israeli state. 
 
CRITICAL HYDROPOLITICS AND DISCOURSE THEORY 
This article builds on and is situated in the literature of critical hydropolitics, which 
provides the theoretical frames for the analysis of this case study. More specifically, 
critical hydropolitics is a sub-field of hydropolitics literature, characterised by its 
critical and engaged research approach. Within critical hydropolitics, Zeitoun and 
Warner (2006) explain in the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (FHH) how control 
over shared water resources is achieved and maintained. The framework is based on 
three pillars: geographical position, three dimensions of power (as per Lukes 
definition) – hard, bargaining, and ideational power - and exploitation potential 
(Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). The authors conclude that consideration of power 
asymmetries help to explain the allocation of the shared water resources among the 
riparian countries of a basin. The FHH has been criticised for being too state-focused, 
for its conceptualisation of hegemony - which fails to capture the impact of foreign 
interference and of the international hegemonic discourses like the role of 
neoliberalism (Davidson-Harden et al., 2007, Kehl, 2015) - and for its 
conceptualisation of hegemony, which seemed not rigorously defined in line with the 
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classical international relations tradition (Selby, 2007). Finally, for Conker (2014) and 
Selby (2007) the FHH overlooks the domestic sphere, focusing more on the states 
interactions. Conker (2014) builds on the FHH by showing how non-state actors are 
able to use discursive power to reach their interests and challenge hydro-hegemonic 
settings. Similarly, Warner and Zawahri (2012) consider tools that non-state-actors 
deploy to shape the behaviour of the hydro-hegemon riparian states. Cascão (2009) 
analysed how non hydro-hegemonic countries can challenge the status quo and to 
contest hegemonic settings, demonstrating that hydro-hegemony is not incontestable. 
Focusing on bargaining power, Daoudy (2009) applies Putnam’s theory to show how 
issue linkages can be deployed to increase bargaining power during negotiations. She 
also highlighted the role of international water law (IWL) in providing more 
legitimacy and bargaining power to the non-hegemonic countries (Daoudy, 2008), 
while Woodhouse and Zeitoun (2008) call for IWL to include covert hegemonic 
practices in its principles (Woodhouse and Zeitoun, 2008). Hussein and Grandi (2017) 
emphasise the necessity of considering the broader socio-political-economic context 
to explain outcomes of transboundary water governance. In fact, as summarised by 
Mirumachi (2015), “the management and governance of shared basins need to 
contend with factors outside of the ‘water box’” (Mirumachi, 2015: 33).  
Cooperation and conflict over shared water resources has also been a topic of 
research of the critical hydropolitics literature, in particular by Zeitoun and 
Mirumachi (2008). They critically examine the role of treaties, which are often seen 
as a good instance of cooperation. They argue that cooperation is not always good, as 
treaties can codify existing asymmetrical status quo, and treaties can become the issue 
of the conflict. Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008) develop the Transboundary Water 
Interaction Nexus (TWINS) matrix to analyse the conflictive and cooperative 
relations between riparian states over shared water (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). 
Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008) go beyond the idea of a continuum of conflict or 
cooperation, emphasising the co-existence of conflict and cooperation. Zeitoun et al. 
(2016) also found that both compliance and contest elements lie within transboundary 
water interactions (Zeitoun et al., 2016). Finally, Menga (2016a) presents the Circle 
of Hydro-Hegemony, an analytical framework that places the concept of hegemony at 
the centre of its structure, illustrating how various forms of power are connective in 
the function of hegemony. Menga (2016b) also shows the domestic and international 
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dimensions of transboundary water politics, examining in particular cases from 
Central Asia (Menga, 2018). 
Within critical hydropolitics, this article focuses on the role of the third 
dimension of power of the FHH – ideational or discursive power – and builds on the 
discourse analysis literature for environmental issues (Hajer 1995; Dryzek 1997). This 
literature emphasizes the importance of discourses in shaping environmental policies. 
People’s understanding of an issue shapes the solutions they would identify to solve 
what they perceive as a problem. Discourses are key as they have a central role in 
mediating people’s understanding of the issue. It results that controlling the discourse 
– meaning how the environmental issue is framed and understood - including 
constructing and shaping discourses, is very important to drive towards certain 
solutions. For Dryzek (1997) a discourse is ‘a shared way of apprehending the world. 
[…] It enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them 
together into coherent stories or accounts,’ thus legitimising knowledge and justifying 
specific policies (1997: 8). For Hajer a discourse is “a specific ensemble of ideas, 
concepts and categories that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular 
set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” 
(Hajer 1995: 44). For him, a discourse is constructed through a number of actions, 
declarations, publications, and events, which constitute and reproduce a discourse. 
Discourses are the place where and around which the power struggle between actors 
and different interests takes place. These literatures and theoretical basis guide this 
article as it allows capturing to what extent the discourse of water scarcity impacts 
TWG in the case of Jordan. 
 
The Jordanian discourse of water scarcity  
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary to explain what the discourse of 
water scarcity in Jordan is. As discussed above, dominant discourses are powerful as 
they can lead towards specific policy-solutions. From the reports, media analysis, and 
the interviews, it emerged that in Jordan there are seven causes for water scarcity that 
are elements of the overarching discourse (Hussein, 2018b): 
 
1) Population growth, immigration and refugees  
2) Unfair sharing with neighbouring countries 
3) Climate change 
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4) Aridity and low precipitation 
5) Non-revenue water due to leakages and physical losses 
6) Non-revenue water due to illegal uses and illegal wells 
7) Unsustainable agricultural water use 
 
The first reason, which is constructed mainly by governmental institutions and 
reproduced by governmentally aligned mass media, identifies population growth as a 
reason for water scarcity, blaming the waves of refugees and immigrants from 
neighbouring countries (Al Rawashdeh, 2012, MercyCorps, 2014, Namrouqa, 2014b, 
2014b). The second reason sees in the unfair sharing with neighbouring countries a 
cause of water scarcity in the country, with positions ranging between those who 
blame Israel and those that blame Syria (Namrouqa, 2010, 2012). The third reason 
believes that climate change and climate variability are a cause of water scarcity. The 
impact of climate change is identified in temperature increases, decrease in 
precipitation, droughts and increase in evaporation, resulting in a reduced recharge of 
aquifers and surface water and in a decrease in the quality of surface and groundwater 
resources (Al Emam, 2016, Greenwood, 2014). The fourth reason underlines the arid 
and semi-arid territory with low precipitation in which Jordan lies (Hussein, 2016, 
Bullock and Darwich, 1993). The fifth cause emphasises non-revenue water due to 
leakages and physical losses, meaning the mismanagement of water resources in the 
country (JICA, 2014, Yorke, 2013, 2016). The sixth cause for water scarcity blames 
the non-revenue water due to illegal uses and illegal wells, estimated to be more than 
1,300 in the country (Petra News, 2014, Namrouqa, 2014a, 2014d, 2008). The seventh 
cause for water scarcity emphasises the unsustainable water uses of the agricultural 
sector, blaming both the type of crops produced - often not suitable to an arid 
environment – and the high subsidies to water for irrigation (Ababsa, 2014, ISSP, 
2012a, 2012b).  
While the first four reason are mainly constructed by the government and 
reproduced by mainstream mass media – becoming the dominant discourse in the 
country – they blame the nature – climate change and aridity – and external factors to 
the government – neighbouring countries and refugees – as causes of water scarcity. 
In so doing, it emphasises that the issue is about the limited water resources in the 
country, and that there is a need to increase the supply in order to meet the growing 
demand. Instead, the last three causes are not dominant and not mainstream often 
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unheard or de-emphasised –, are constructed by NGOs and donors, and they underline 
that if there is water scarcity it is mainly due to mismanagement of the existing water 
resources – which are enough to meet the demand if well used. Hence, they drive 
towrds policy-solutions on the demand side, pushing for better management and 
challenging the status quo (MWI, 2009). However, being the first four causes the 
dominant ones, the policy-solutions sought by the Jordanian government are mainly 
on the supply side, which would also allow not challenging the current water uses – 
meaning the status quo and the existing benefits and interests linked to them. The 
policy-solutions pushed by the government, consequently, have been and are the Disi 
Canal project, the RSDSC Project, and the Wahda Dam (more on these in the next 
sections) (Hussein, 2016). 
The supply side focus of the government emerges strongly in the 
governmental reports and in the interviews to senior high level officials of the MWI. 
For instance, in the National Water Strategy WFL published in 2009 there is a strong 
emphasis on the RSDSC and Disi projects, which are seen as vital for achieving water 
security in the country. They are seen as the only solution to meet the growing 
demand, and strategic for Jordan’s national water security (MWI, 2009). The WFL 
dedicates three pages in its executive summary for graphs showing that only with the 
RSDSC project Jordan will be able to balance demand and supply by 2022 (MWI, 
2009: 1-5, 1-6, 1-7). For a former minister of the MWI, “the national water security in 
Jordan is related to the RSDSC project”, as the only solution for the water scarcity in 
Jordan can be desalination. Al Hamidi reports in the newspaper Al Rai that for 
Jordanian specialists and governmental officials “the ‘two seas project’ is the only 
sustainable solution to solve the water scarcity issue” (Al Hamidi, 2012). In addition, 
it shows that for the Jordanian government the natural solution to water scarcity, often 
also referred to as the only solution, is to be found on the supply side, through mega 
projects and engineering solutions, and the RSDSC is a key project and an important 
national priority (Al Hamidi, 2012). As put by Weinthal et al. (2015: 299), “Jordanian 
policymakers have framed the security implications of water […] in terms of the need 
to build large-scale infrastructure projects to increase water supplies”. This shows 
how the discourse of water scarcity is driving towards supply side solutions, in 
particular of transboundary nature (Hussein, 2017c). 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYDROPOLITICAL DYNAMICS 
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The WFL strategy underlines that “Jordan shall protect and defend the rightful shares 
of the Kingdom’s water resources through bilateral and multilateral contacts, 
negotiations, and agreements” (MWI, 2009: 3-9). In the WFL strategy, the water 
scarcity discourse drives towards three transboundary solutions: to claim and increase 
the Jordanian share rights on transboundary water resources; the RSDSC; and the Disi 
projects (MWI, 2009: 3-9). These solutions are backed by the government, the MWI, 
the MFA, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), and the 
king (ibid.). In the WFL, water scarcity is framed in terms of water security, seeing 
the construction of these large infrastructures as key to ensure water security and 
national security in Jordan (MWI, 2009). The scarcity discourse is directly linked to 
water security, making the issue of water scarcity part of the national security agenda 
(MWI, 2009). While it emerges that the water scarcity discourse drives towards TWG 
solutions, this section focuses on understanding to what extent the WLF strategy is 
implemented concerning the transboundary solutions, in particular on claiming and 
increasing the Jordanian share rights on transboundary water resources.  
 
Development of the Jordanian-Syrian hydropolitical dynamics 
This section argues that the Jordanian-Syrian hydropolitical relations, although 
governed by bilateral agreements since 1953, have been conflictive. So while 
cooperation between the two countries resulted in signing bilateral agreements, these 
agreements co-existed with conflictive relations. Jordan - the non-hydro-hegemon - 
failed in increasing the water resources through cooperation with Syria. 
There have been two agreements signed by the Jordanian and Syrian 
governments over the Yarmouk River, respectively in 1953 and 1987. The first 
agreement envisioned a dam near Maqarin with a capacity of 300 MCM (today’s 
Wahda or Unity dam) and a hydropower station at Adasiya, where the electricity 
produced was to be allocated on a 75% - 25% basis between Syria and Jordan (UN-
ESCWA, 2013: 210-211, Haddadin, 2009: 421, Hof, 1998: 84). However, these 
projects never materialised. According to the Jordanian officials, in the decades after 
1953, the Syrian government reduced the flow of the river downstream, without 
informing the Jordanian government, by expanding the use of upstream springs; 
increasing the use of groundwater resources feeding the springs on the Jordanian side; 
and damming the tributaries to the river (Haddadin, 2006: 251). The Jordanian 
government perceived that the Syrian “act was in clear violation of the 1953 bilateral 
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agreement between the two countries” (ibid.). Haddadin, former Jordanian minister of 
water and irrigation, emphasised that “the Syrians have consistently violated the 
provisions of the 1953 Agreement” (Haddadin, 2012: 280). 
In 1987 the two governments renegotiated a new agreement on the Yarmouk 
River (Curtis, 2006: 33), which included the following provisions: it outlined a 
smaller dam with maximum capacity of 225 MCM and 126 m high (known as Wahda 
or Unity Dam) and a reservoir at Maqarin; it changed the approach to dispute 
resolution making it inter-governmental and not subjected to third-parties arbitration 
(as in the 1953 agreement) which worked to Syria’s advantage; and recognised Syrian 
use of the 26 dams on the river and its tributaries and Jordan’s right to store Yarmouk 
resources only after the filling of all Syrian dams (Hof, 1998: 87, UN-ESCWA, 2013: 
211, Hussein, 2017a). 
Works for the Wahda Dam project started on the 9th of February 2004 
(Rosenberg, 2006: 28, Zawahri, 2010: 137-138, Curtis, 2006), but its construction 
encountered long delays before it became operational in 2006. In an interview, a high 
level MWI official emphasised that the Jordanian government saw the dam as a 
potential contributor to the solution for the water scarcity issue. However, since its 
completion, the dam never reached the full capacity of 110 MCM, but its maximum 
storage was reached in 2009/2010 at 20 MCM (UN- ESCWA, 2013: 211), even if 
after the Syrian political crisis higher amounts are being registered. The Joint Water 
Committee established with the 1987 agreement discussed the issue of the decreased 
water flow, calling in 2009 for a joint study on the quality and quantity of the water in 
the basin (UN-ESCWA, 2013: 212). Nevertheless, Mousa Jamani, former Jordanian 
minister of the MWI, noted that “the number of Syrian dams increased from 26 to 48, 
while around 3,500 wells were drilled to pump water from the river basin” without 
Jordanian consent (Namrouqa, 2012). Jamani also noted that "the solution to 
Yarmouk Basin water sharing is not technical, it is political" (Namrouqa, 2012). 
 
The Jordanian-Syrian transboundary water governance: failed Jordanian political and 
diplomatic claims attempts 
As seen above, the Jordanian government has been claiming the fair Jordanian rights’ 
share of the river and condemning the Syrian violations of the bilateral treaty, trying 
to increase its share by renegotiating and signing a treaty with the Syrian government 
in 1987. However, the Jordanian government failed in increasing its share on the 
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river. 
From the Syrian perspective, supporting the Jordanian government was not a 
priority for geopolitical reasons. In fact, the Jordanian government has been a close 
ally of the US and Israeli ones, while the Syrian government has been closer to the 
Russian and Iranian ones. In addition, while for Jordan the water issue is a top priority 
at the national level, in the case of the bilateral relations with the Syrian government, 
water was not the top priority when compared to other inter-sectorial relations. In fact, 
according to a former Jordanian ambassador, “was not on top of the Jordanian priority 
list, water was a topic that was given to the engineers. The priorities of our foreign 
policies towards Syria were: trade, the peace process, and political”. As summarised 
by a former Jordanian minister of the MWI, it was difficult for the Jordanian 
government to stop the Syrian violations for the following reasons: the political 
alliances and objectives of the two countries were strongly different; the Syrian state 
was upstream and the Jordanian one downstream; Jordan was the non-hydro-
hegemon; it had a population of 5 million people while Syria had 25 million people; 
the transit trade through Syria for the benefit of Jordan was strategic for the Jordanian 
government. The consolidated and important interests in the other sectors, in 
particular trade, are the main reason for which the Jordanian government never 
undertook any action against the Syrian violations apart from releasing statements 
condemning them. 
In this case, competing national security agendas and geopolitical 
considerations are more significant for TWG. In a nutshell, the discourse of water 
scarcity is one of many – and not the only one - determinants of the hydropolitical 
relations and of TWG in the Jordanian-Syrian case, and in the case of competing 
national security agendas, water policy-solutions of the non-hydro-hegemon are 
overlooked. 
 
Development of the Jordanian-Israeli hydropolitical dynamics 
This section argues that the 1994 peace treaty simply formalised the existing water 
regime as well as the bilateral non-official relations over water that existed between 
the Jordanian and Israeli governments since 1948. The Jordanian government 
succeeded in strengthening the transboundary water cooperation through treaties and 
to increase the water resources through support for the RSDSC project. 
Albeit formal diplomatic relations between the two governments started only 
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in 1994, the two governments have been having non-official relations over water 
resources since 1948. Since the 1950s, Israeli and Jordanian officials have been 
meeting under the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) 
umbrella to discuss the management of the shared water resources. Since the 1970s, 
the informal secret meetings, also known as “picnic table talks,” became more regular 
- every two to three weeks - and aimed at discussing the allocation of the water of the 
Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers (Jägerskog, 2003: 143-144). The two governments 
formalised this water regime on the 26th of October 1994 by signing the peace treaty 
at the border crossing of Wadi Araba. The bilateral peace treaty had a section on 
water; article 6 covering in five paragraphs the general principles on water; while 
annex II provided details on the implementation of article 6. The water section of the 
treaty mainly focused on surface water, specifying the water allocation, storage, 
quality, but it also considered the contested groundwater in Wadi Araba, as well as 
the establishment of a Joint Water Committee (JWC). 
While the 1994 agreement is not always perceived by Jordanian officials to be 
a good agreement, interviews with high level Jordanian officials showed that they 
believe that overall it has been respected by both sides, even if it did not bring the two 
countries to the expected warm peace. Substantiation of this assertion comes from 
consideration of the bilateral relations on water are generally perceived by 
governmental officials to be good, as emerged in the interviews. As a senior official 
from the MWI underlined, the treaty over water resources is generally respected; 
whether it was a good or bad agreement is another issue. Interviews with Jordanian 
diplomats show that the 1994 treaty was expected to be the starting point of a warm 
peace between the two countries, and that transboundary cooperation on key 
commercial issues, including water and energy, would have driven the countries 
towards a warm cooperation. The 50 MCM per year that the Israeli government has to 
give to the Jordanian government has been overall respected. However, the peace 
treaty did not lead to the warm relations they initially envisaged (Barari, 2014, Barari, 
2004). The bilateral relations remained cold and mainly technical, including the water 
sector, in part because of the lack of public opinion support to the peace treaty from 
the Jordanian side. However, Jordanian-Israeli relations need to be considered 
together with the Palestinian-Israeli relations. This was the main cause for a lot of 
immobility on the Jordanian-Israeli relations. Both the Jordanian and Israeli 
government respected the treaty, but mistakenly thought it would generate warm 
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relations; culturally, socially, and even people-to-people. As noted by a former 
Jordanian ambassador, the 1994 treaty on water has been delivered, but the peace 
issue has not, essentially because the bilateral relations include considerations of the 
Israeli illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories. 
In December 2013 the Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian governments signed 
an agreement of cooperation on the RSDSC, which was strongly backed by the 
Jordanian government (Hussein, 2017b). Jordanian officials would argue that this is 
an instance of Jordanian success towards the goal of strengthening transboundary 
cooperation to increase water resources in the country. 
 
The Jordanian-Israeli transboundary water governance: successful strengthening of 
water cooperation 
This section shows that the issue of water scarcity pushed the Jordanian government 
to strengthen the bilateral water cooperation by signing the 1994 agreement and then 
by signing the 2013 RSDSC agreement. This article argues that the Jordanian efforts 
to increase the water share and the development of the shared water resources have 
been successful. In other words, converging national security agendas were key in 
enabling implementation of the transboundary policy-solutions driven towards by the 
water scarcity discourse. 
Concerning the 1994 agreement, apart from the formalisation of the existing 
water regime, Manna (Manna, 2006: 60) notes that for the Israeli government the 
normalisation of the relations with Jordan was the main goal, while the Jordanian 
government was driven by commercial interests, mainly water security. For a former 
Jordanian minister of the MFA, a high priority for the Jordanian government was 
water, as the discourse of water scarcity at that time was as prominent as it is today, 
resulting in the perception of urgency around the issue of water scarcity. For him, 
“water was among the five key issues negotiated in 1994 as it is one strategic sector, 
as important as the other four. [...] Water is a matter of life or death, and this pushed 
the Jordanian negotiators towards concluding the peace treaty with Israel” (ibid.). For 
a Jordanian ambassador who was involved in the negotiations in 1994, water relations 
are good because it is a quantified issue, it was specified in terms of numbers, and 
“while it was a technical issue, it was a very important issue for Jordan. The issue of 
water scarcity was a main driver for Jordan. In Israel today they have 30% more water 
than they need, we don’t, especially because of waves of refugees at that time as well 
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as now with the Syrian refugees”. This emphasises two important points: the 
relevance as important causes of water scarcity of: neighbouring countries like Israel; 
and of population growth and waves of refugees. For Haddadin, former Jordanian 
minister of the MWI involved in the 1994 peace negotiations, “water obviously 
ranked high on the agenda of Jordan’s negotiations with Israel [... and] the treaty 
addressed water and stressed the need for bilateral cooperation to alleviate the water 
shortage in each country” (Haddadin, 2006: 256). During negotiations, “the Jordanian 
team leader pressed [...that] Jordan was in need of more water [...] and explained the 
tight water situation in Amman” (Haddadin, 2012: 303). During the negotiations, the 
Israeli “tried their best to take advantage of Jordan’s need for a diversion weir” and 
for water, emphasised Haddadin (Haddadin, 2012: 233).  
According to Western diplomats and representatives of international 
organisations in Amman, for the Israeli government it is a priority to maintain a 
strong military and security cooperation with the Jordanian government aiming at 
supporting a successful Jordanian state. The main reason why the Israeli government 
supports a stable Jordanian state is that the two countries share their longest border. 
Therefore, for the Israeli government the Jordanian border is safe and well protected 
by the bilateral military and security cooperation. In addition, Jordan is one of the two 
Arab countries that recognises the Israeli state and with which it has diplomatic 
relations, contributing to providing the state of Israel with political legitimisation. The 
geopolitical reason for the Israeli support to the state of Jordan is that the latter is seen 
by the Israeli government as a buffer zone, a safe and stable political territory which 
divides the state of Israel from the states of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Especially 
nowadays, the state of Jordan separates and protects the state of Israel from the 
Islamic State forces deployed in parts of the states of Iraq and of Syria. In addition, 
the state of Jordan absorbed several waves of Palestinian refugees, and is seen from 
the Israeli government as a territory for the absorption of even more Palestinians in 
the next decades. Finally, both the Israeli and Jordanian governments are close allies 
of the US. For all these reasons, the Israeli government has as a top priority 
maintaining and supporting the political stability of the state of Jordan. It does so also 
by strengthening the cooperation over water resources, as this is seen as vital by the 
Jordanian government (Barari, 2014: 69-71, Barari, 2004: 7, Welsh, 2014, Solomon, 
2014). 
This section showed that the Jordanian government successfully pursued the 
 17 
policy-solutions of transboundary nature in the WFL in the relations with Israel. This 
section argued that this is due to several related issues, including inter-sectorial 
relations, geopolitical alliances, Israeli interests about the Jordanian political stability, 
and the Jordanian economic development goals. TWG solutions were achieved 
because of the convergence national security agendas, which were aligned with the 
TWG solutions suggested in the WTF. In a nutshell, this section showed that the 
discourse of water scarcity is one of many – and not the only one - determinants of the 
hydropolitical relations and of TWG. 
 
Development of the Jordanian-Saudi hydropolitical dynamics 
This section argues that the two governments concluded an agreement in 2015, 
ensuring the Saudi support to the Jordanian uses of the aquifer. Overall, the Jordanian 
government succeeded in strengthening the transboundary water cooperation through 
a treaty and support for the Disi project. 
As formal official relations between the two countries over the groundwater 
resources have been lacking in the past decades, both countries started exploiting the 
Disi aquifer. Apart from an agreement signed in 1965 for land exchange that provided 
Jordan with the coastal area around the city of Aqaba on the Red Sea, there have been 
no other agreements on land or water between the two countries until 2015. Since the 
1965 agreement, there has been a forum for exchange of data on the Disi, but the 
Saudi government has not been keen in providing data on the use of this groundwater 
resource (Allen, 2010). Nevertheless, starting from the 1980s this aquifer was used for 
agricultural purposes by both countries. The Saudi government promoted exploitation 
of the Disi resources for cereals production and became a cereals exporter, negatively 
impacting the quantity of the non-renewable aquifer (Ferragina and Greco, 2008: 
452). In 1986, the Jordanian government leased 10.000 ha state-land for 25 years to 
four agro-companies - Ram, Wafa, Arabco, Grameco - to produce wheat, allowing 
them to pump 70-80 MCM a year from the Disi aquifer for free (Ferragina and Greco, 
2008: 452, Barham, 2012: 3). For Haddadin, the Jordanian government decided to 
transfer water from the Disi aquifer to Aqaba since the early 1980s, aiming at solving 
“the escalating demand for municipal and industrial water in Aqaba” (Haddadin, 
2006: 71). However, it is argued that the Jordanian side had low extractions, and 
therefore the Jordanian government decided to start over-exploiting the aquifer to 
establish historical uses rights in order to negotiate a future agreement beneficial to 
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the state of Jordan rather than for food security considerations (Ferragina and Greco, 
2008). “The companies using Disi water for irrigation argue that Saudi Arabia agro-
businesses are extracting large amounts of ground water from the same aquifer 
complex which might cause detriments to Jordan’s share in the water. Why not doing 
that in Jordan?” (Salameh et al., 2014: 1685). 
This “pumping race” (Shapland, 1997: 150), also known as “race to the 
bottom” (Zeitoun in de Gooijer et al., 2009: 19) and a “voluntary silence pumping 
race” (Ferragina and Greco, 2008: 459), was focusing on exploiting water for 
irrigation in the late 1980s and in the 1990s. However, given the non-renewable 
nature of this groundwater resource and the perceived increasing water scarcity in the 
country, the government decided to use this resource for drinking and municipal use 
(Haddadin, 2006: 71, 144, 206). Therefore, the government pushed for pumping the 
Disi water to Amman to solve the issue of water scarcity in the big urban centres of 
the northern part of the country (Salameh et al., 2014: 1686)(ibid.). The Disi project is 
seen by governmental officials, media, academics, and the king as a vital project for 
the water security of the country (Hussein, 2016: ch.7). They perceive it as a key short 
term solution for the water sector in the state of Jordan. “The Disi project is the 
largest strategic venture implemented with the cooperation of the private sector and is 
one of Jordan’s solutions to its pressing water crisis” underlined the minister of MWI, 
Hazem Al Nasser (Namrouqa, 2013), who stated also that this project is a “major 
milestone for the water sector” (Namrouqa, 2014c). Also the king stated in a press 
release that “the Disi project [...] is considered as one of the vital ventures in 
managing water resources, addressing the problem of water scarcity and resolving it 
across all the governorates of the Kingdom.” 
The Disi project connecting Disi to Greater Amman region, a distance of 
around 325 km, has been operating since July 2013 and aims at providing drinking 
water to the capital, where most of the water demand is concentrated, allowing for 
partial restoration of the overexploited renewable aquifers of Amman and northern 
governorates’ aquifers (Halasah and Ammary, 2007: 5). The Disi project has been 
carried out without the consensus of or an agreement with Saudi government. For this 
reason as well as for environmental concerns, the project did not receive the economic 
support of the World Bank or of international donors (Ferragina and Greco, 2008: 
454). Finally, in May 2015, after the Jordanian government proved the historical uses 
showing the acquired rights on the basin, a bilateral agreement between the two 
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governments was reached and signed. In this way, the Jordanian government ensured 
the Saudi approval for the Disi project and for the status quo it had created. 
 
The Jordanian-Saudi transboundary water governance: unilateral Jordanian actions 
and successful negotiations 
Concerning the Jordanian-Saudi hydropolitical relations, the section above showed 
that the Jordanian government was successful in exploiting the Disi aquifer, and in 
undertaking unilateral actions to construct the Disi project. The Saudi government did 
not openly oppose the project, and was not vocal in trying or considering stopping it. 
According to a high level official of the MWI, from 2006 the two governments started 
discussing and working on an agreement, which was accepted in 2011/2012 
specifying the levels of extractions from the Disi, and the Disi project that the 
Jordanian government started building was in line with what was agreed. In May 
2015, the two governments formalised this decision by signing the bilateral agreement 
on the Disi aquifer. The project has been completed unilaterally, without Saudi 
official consent or cooperation, but also without public Saudi opposition to the 
project. In May 2015, an agreement between the governments of Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia was signed. 
To explain the different outcome of this case, it is necessary to include 
considerations of the broader context. This article argues that the reasons of the Saudi 
government to help the Jordanian government by tacitly and then officially supporting 
the Disi project, strongly wanted by the Jordanian government, are related to broader 
context’ considerations. 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan share a long border. According to Jordanian and 
European diplomats interviewed, for the Saudi government, it is strongly beneficial to 
have a stable Jordanian state as it prevents the Saudi one from bordering with the 
Syrian and Israeli states. For high level officials from the MFA, the bilateral relations 
between the Jordanian and Saudi governments became even stronger in the past ten 
years, as most of the other Jordanian borders are unstable, and therefore trade 
relations between the two countries on energy intensified. The Jordanian relations 
with the GCC countries improved. Since 1967, year of the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank, the Jordanian government has faced many issues due to waves of 
refugees, and for a high level official from the MoPIC, the Saudi government has 
supported the Jordanian government economically and with resources to maintain the 
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Jordanian social and political stability. 
However, the Saudi government, while supporting the Jordanian government, 
aimed at having a surviving but weak Jordanian government. As put by a former 
Jordanian minister of the MFA, the Saudis want “Jordan to survive but in a weak 
way: on one foot but never prosper”. Also for a Western diplomat in Amman, the 
Saudi government likes to keep the Jordanian government “on a short leash”, giving 
them financial support to maintain them at flow, but not to make them prosper. For 
him, a Saudi interest is also to keep using the Jordanian government to talk to Iran and 
Israel, and to the Iraqi one during Saddam’s times. Finally, both the Jordanian and 
Saudi governments are close allies of the US one, and are aligned concerning regional 
geopolitics. Both countries support the US positions concerning Syria, Iraq, and they 
are both allies versus Iran. For all these reasons, the Saudi government has as a top 
priority maintaining and supporting the political stability of Jordan, and it does so also 
by strengthening the cooperation over water resources, as this is seen as vital by the 
Jordanian government for its stability. 
This section showed that the reason for the Saudi support is of political 
economy and mainly geopolitical, therefore due to elements of the broader context, 
rather than water only related considerations. This section affirmed once again that 
TWG and hydropolitical dynamics are shaped not by the discourse of water scarcity 
alone, but by the discourse of water scarcity seen within the broader context. In fact, 
only the convergence of national security agendas made it possible for Jordan to 
achieve the WFL transboundary goals.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study demonstrated that cooperation and conflict on TWG is shaped not by the 
discourse of water scarcity alone, but by the discourse of water scarcity seen within 
the broader context. It also argued that it is necessary to consider different national 
security agendas and whether they are competing or converging to understand the 
extent to which the TWG policy-solutions in the WFL will be successful.  
While the deployment of the water scarcity discourse drove towards solutions 
of increasing the water supply by claiming the Jordanian share rights on the 
transboundary water resources, the Jordanian efforts had different outcomes in the 
three cases considered. In fact, the Syrian, Israeli, and Saudi governments had 
different considerations in relation to allowing the Jordanian government to increase 
 21 
its share over the transboundary water resources. For the latter two governments, 
maintaining the political stability in the state of Jordan is a priority, which resulted 
and results in supporting the Jordanian government, albeit to different extents, to 
maintain its social and political stability also through its water sector. This is because 
the national security agendas of both countries converged. In fact, ensuring the water 
security of Jordan means also ensuring the national security of the country, and 
supporting Jordan through transboundary cooperation, the RSDSC or Disi project 
meant cooperation on security issues and political stability of Jordan, which are 
priorities for Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Syrian government, instead, does not have 
a strong geopolitical interest in supporting the Jordanian government, and this 
explains why the Syrian government is lukewarm in helping the Jordanian 
government, including when it comes to TWG. Competing national security agendas 
undermined the Jordanian efforts in reaching the TWG goals. Concerning the 
Jordanian reaction to the lukewarm approach of Syria, it emerged that the Jordanian 
government had vital trade, economic, and commercial interests with the state of 
Syria, shaping the outcome of bilateral water relations. For this reason, the Jordanian 
government has in practice never taken any action against the Syria government, apart 
from declarations condemning the Syrian government for the breach of the 
agreement.  
It is therefore necessary to consider not only TWG, but also the broader 
bilateral relations, including competing or converting national security agendas, to 
what extent the other government has an interest in supporting the Jordanian 
government in ensuring water security. For instance, often water is not on top of the 
political bilateral agenda in comparison to the economic interests existing between the 
Jordanian and other governments. As Daoudy would put it, to understand water 
relations and dynamics between two countries, it is necessary to also look at issue 
linkages, as inter-sectorial relations can overcome conflictive relations and change 
power asymmetries on transboundary water resources (Daoudy, 2009). To do so, it is 
necessary to consider the broader context (Hussein and Grandi, 2015; Hussein and 
Grandi, 2017, Lowi, 1995). Therefore, this article argued that it is necessary to 
consider the water scarcity discourse as situated in the broader bilateral relations, 
including geopolitical dynamics, and the inter-sectorial interests of the governments, 
in order to understand the different factors impacting TWG. The conceptual 
implication of this finding is that discourse theory needs to be supplemented also by 
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material considerations.  
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